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Historical Culture: Russia in Search of Itself
Boris Paramonov
Russia's 75 year-long experiment with communism is over, but the
question persists as to whether the Soviet regime was a historical
aberration or an expression of the country's destiny. This question is as
old as the Bolshevik revolution. It has produced a voluminous literature
and will no doubt continue to attract attention in the near future. Alas, it
can not be answered conclusively, for it is grounded in the questioner's
ideological a priori and tells us more about the historian's biases than
about Russian history.
Still, it would be wrong to dismiss this question as purely theoretical. The
point is not so much to fathom some impersonal logic determining Russia
's fate as to understand how its history has been construed by those
caught in its web and how this self-understanding has shaped the nation's
historical landscapes. We can talk in this regard about "historical culture"
or a set of beliefs about the nation's destiny entertained by its subjects in
a particular era. Tradition informs the ways people think and act, but
concrete historical individuals reproduce their tradition according to the
personal knowledge about its hidden logic, ultimate meaning, and final
destination. A concrete historical culture is rarely uniform; it contains
diverse, even contradictory, precepts that could gain prominence for a
time and leave their mark on the course of national development. There is
a choice to be made, a legacy to be claimed, and it is up to concrete
historical subjects to grasp the alternatives and realize them in their
historical practice.
Our task here is to understand Russian historical culture in its internal
contradictions, to delineate the guideposts it offers to historical actors,
and to assess the impact these broad orientations might have on the
development of postcommunist Russia . I start with the main themes and
symbols informing Russian historical culture, show how these key insights
have been appropriated in the Soviet and post-Soviet period of Russian
history, and conclude with some speculations about Russia 's future.
The Images of the National History in Pre-Revolutionary Russia
Central for Russian historical culture is the question of Russia 's relation to
the West. Westernizers believe that Russia is fundamentally a European
country, that it shares with the West basic values and institutions, and

that in spite of unfortunate historical detours, it evolves according to
Western historical blueprints. Slavophiles, by contrasts, are convinced that
Russia 's historical path is unique, that its spiritual values are at odds with
the Occidental tradition, and that its historical destiny is loftier than the
fate ordained for Western countries. The conflict between westernizers
and slavophiles was fully articulated in the 19th century. In many ways, it
reflected the spirit of the time, notably the Romantic reaction to the
French Revolution and the Enlightenment. But the political fissures on
which this division was based go back to the origins of the Russian state.
The oldest Russian chronicle narrates a story about the Slavs calling on
the Normans to come to Russia and reign over its unruly subjects. The
debates about the veracity of this account are as interminal as about the
origins of Russian communism. We have nothing to add to this
controversy, except to point out how profoundly ingrained it is in the
nation's psyche. If it is a myth, it is a productive one, and we should grasp
it in the Jungian sense, i.e., not as a legend or fable but as a formative
element of the collective unconscious where many features determining
the national character and the nation's spiritual potential are formed. The
story about the Scandinavian warriors invited to bring order to Russia
hints at the Western roots of Russian statehood. In the westernizing
reading, it is primarily a story about the relationship between the leaders
and the populace in which the dominant role is accorded to the state and
state power.
According to S. M. Soloviev, a 19th century Russian historian, the Russian
knights from the Rurik house founded by the Normans were originally
collective owners of Russian land. [1] Each nobleman was assigned to a
particular estate or domain given to the knight according to his seniority
and the place in the patrimonial hierarchy. The relationship between the
nobleman and his abode was a tenuous one. The knights frequently
moved to new locations according to their seniority. The older the knight
and the greater his prominence, the more central and desirable his
domain. With such a pattern of mobility, no strong relationship could be
formed between the entrusted territory and a particular knight and his
family. It was certainly not the relationship of ownership, insofar as the
nobleman owed to the state his fortunes and had to be prepared to move
onto a new location on a moment's notice. You can discern in this social
order a vague prototype of communist nomenclatura with its life-long
security and requisite perks: dedicated servants of the ruling house are
sent to represent the central powers in a region where they lord over a
given domain and its people for as long as they retain the ruler's trust. It
was not until the 12th century, when Andrey Bogoliubsky, the oldest

nobleman at the time, refused to move to the central Kiev 's principality
and announced his decision to stay in his old Vladimir-Suzdal domain, that
a more enduring bond was being formed between the knight and his
estate.
This train of thought was further developed by another 19th century
historian, B. N. Chicherin, who argued that the state dominated civil
society in Russia : the state used its power to elevate or downgrade
individuals into social strata, to institutionalize certain social processes
which might be alien to the popular impulses. Thus, Russian gentry first
appeared not as a class of warriors spontaneously settling the land but as
a special service stratum whose members were summoned to fulfill certain
state-appointed duties. The same was the case with the Russian peasantry
that was assigned to work for the gentry in lieu of payment from the state
to its noble servants. By the mid-17th century, most peasants were
pressed into bondage to the gentry, which in turn was rewarded for its
military service with bigger and more populous estates. As time went by,
the state again took initiative in creating new social estates and groups. In
1762, the state decree freed the nobility from the obligation to serve in
state institutions, turning it into a landed gentry proper. Next, came the
turn of urban craftsmen and merchants who were pressed into a kind of
third estate and encouraged to evolve into a Russian bourgeoisie. Finally,
in 1861, the serfs were freed from bondage and permitted to function as
free peasants tilling the local land. [2]
Both Chicherin and Soloviev were westernizers by the 19th century
standards, their ideas inspired by Hegel's teaching about the state as a
pinnacle of socio/historical development. Their message to the authorities
and the educated Russian class was that all historical states, including the
Russian one, evolve according to the same blueprint, pass through similar
stages, and end up in a legal, rational, ideologically neutral state that
embodies the world-historical wisdom. Notice that this westernizing
mentality was largely secular. Westernizers refused to acknowledge a
special relationship that was formed between state and church in Russia .
And this is where slavophiles took them to task.
Indeed, the Russian state was never ideologically neutral. From the start,
the paternalistic powers of the Tsars were inextricably linked with the
religious authority of the Russian Orthodox Church. The latter comprised a
crucial element in the triangular structure of power in Russia, captured in
the famous slogan "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Populism [narodnost]." Up until
the 17th century, the state power retained its unmistakably sacred
character conferred on it by Russian Orthodoxy. The desacralization of the

Russian state began in the middle of the 17th century, under Tsar
Alexander Mikhailovich, when the Russian Orthodox Church split into the
"old-believers" who advocated the autonomy of the Church and the
proponents of the Patriarch Nikon, who pressed for changes in the
traditional Orthodox liturgy and bowed to the state as a supreme authority
in spiritual matters. [3] The schism within the Church marked the
beginning of the secularization process during which the state increasingly
emancipated itself from the religious influence and eventually
subordinated Eastern Orthodox Christianity to its needs. The secular
reforms undertaken by Tsar Alexander Mikhailovich were continued and
deepened in the early 18th century by Peter the Great, who did more than
any other Tsar to cut the clerical influence down to size and establish the
Russian state as a secular entity similar to the absolute states found in
European countries at the time. However, the secularization of state
power was never complete, nor was it as auspicious a development in
Russian history as westernizers thought.
If westernizers saw the state as a conduit for the Western spirit and
credited it with the civilizing effect on Russia , slavophiles considered it a
necessary evil, a legal-rational political form alien to the people's ethical
sensibilities and inimical to the nation's historical destiny. Nineteen
century slavophilism is reminiscent of Jean Jacques Rousseau, with his
deep mistrust of science, technology and progress. The place of the noble
savage in the slavophile teaching was assigned to the Russian peasants
whose simplicity, endurance, and faith defeated the enlightened emperor
Napoleon -- "the revolution on the horse." Leo Tolstoy's novel War and
Piece was perhaps the best literary rendering of slavophilism. [4]
It was an article of faith with slavophiles that the endogenous form of
political and spiritual life in Russia was the peasant commune (obshchina):
"A commune is a union of people who shed their egoism and renounced
their personality; it is an expression of collective consensus, a high
Christian act of love," wrote Konstantin Aksakov, a prominent slavophile.
"Thus, commune is a moral chorus . . . a chorale celebrating the soil,
while personality is like a false note in a choir." [5] Slavophiles liked to
dwell on the fact that "peasant" and "Christian" in the Russian language
were kindred words (krestianin andkhristianin). "Commune" was for them
not so much social as a religious category. A repository of non-secular
consciousness, commune embodied the pristine qualities of sacred Russia
, the qualities preserved by the old-believers rather than by the
established and state-controlled church. K. Aksakov deepened the schism
by juxtaposing the Folk (narod) to the state and the public (the educated,
westernized class). "State" and "Land" were radically opposed in

Aksakov's interpretation, with "Land" symbolizing the folkways, the
heaven, the truth, the virtue, and the beauty, while "State" connoting
everything secular, mundane, willful, and immoral. The history of the
state was here intricately tied to the story of the original sin. Both
represented the fall from grace and pointed to the inevitability of suffering
and redemption in the post-Eden history. However, people were believed
to be loftier than the state, for they were closer to the pristine conditions
of the paradise lost. Although people must submit to the state power, they
also have to stay aloof from it, resist its contaminating influence. No legal
rational category could do justice to the folkways -- the very notion of law
was deemed below the dignity of Russian people. "Render onto State the
unlimited right to act and set laws; give to Land the right to free opinion
and speech . . . external rightness belongs to State, inner truth -- to
Land; give unlimited power to the Tsar but full freedom of spirit to the
people; the freedom of law and legal action goes to the Tsar, the freedom
of opinion and word -- to the people." [6]
Under the mask of resignation, we find here a rejection of legal-rational
institutions represented by the state, which was denied any moral
sanction. This mistrust of the state and the rejection of legal institutions
would profoundly influence Russian consciousness. It accounts for the
strong inclination on the part of Russian intellectuals to define concrete
socio-political problems in ideological and quasi-religious terms.
The authorities were aware of this deep-seated resentment that
slavophiles harbored toward the state and paid it back with suspicion.
Under Nikolai I, slavophiles were treated rather harshly. His successor,
Alexander II, tried a different tactic: he incorporated some of the
slavophile premises into his political program. The slavophile influence
could be seen in the fact that the 1861 reform which freed the Russian
peasants from bondage preserved intact the commune as a social unit
around which village life would evolve after the emancipation. [7] By
making a concession to slavophilism, the state authorities sought to
preserve and strengthen their paternalistic image. As a result, the great
masses of Russian people, most notably the peasantry, had not been
exposed to the westernizing influence.
The state's concern for its image among Russian people was in part due to
the authorities' fear of a new social force emerging in the Russian political
arena -- the intelligentsia. In the Russian context, intelligentsia signified
not a professional class or an intellectual elite but a radical group of
ideologues who styled themselves as guardians of the people protecting
the simple folks against the tyranny of the state and the exploitation of

the ruling classes. At first, the intelligentsia's members were recruited
among the ruling strata. These were the so-called "repentant noblemen"
troubled by a sense of guilt about the serfdom. Then, a socially diverse
group of educated individuals joined the ranks of intelligentsia and carried
out the torch of struggle against the oppression. What distinguished this
group's outlook was the ideologically super-charged, quasi-religious
perception of the Russian people as the embodiment of everything good
and the rejection of the godless state as a callous institution
unsympathetic to the plight of its meek subjects and willing to use naked
power to assert its will. The Russian intelligentsia was the first group to
embrace socialist teachings and make a strenuous attempt to bring
socialism to Russia . Although more pragmatic and sociologically-minded
than the 19th century intelligentsia, the Bolsheviks would inherit this lofty,
paternalistic vision of people as a toiling mass led to freedom and
happiness by the revolutionary intelligentsia. In sum, the historical culture
in pre-revolutionary Russia was informed by the ongoing debate about
Russia's relation to the West. While westernizers saw nation building in
the country as a part of world historical evolution, slavophiles drew
attention to the unique properties of Russian history manifest in the sharp
split between the power-wielding, law-giving, secular state and the
pristine, religious, communally-minded people. Both readings reflected
some historical realities, yet both were highly selective in what their
proponents chose to highlight or ignore. Westernizers tended to overlook
that the Russian state did not completely sever its ties with the church,
that it never became a genuinely secular institution, that it paid more than
lip service to slavophile sentiments, and that it often carried out proWestern reforms in a brutal fashion undermining their liberal spirit and
reflecting the heritage of native despotism. By the same token, slavophile
intellectuals conveniently overlooked the fact that state authorities made
genuine strides in building a civil society in Russia and relieving the plight
of its people. Indeed, it was the Russian state that freed Russian peasants
from bondage in 1861 and was behind the 1909 Stolypin reforms designed
to create strong farmers tilling their own land. Again, it was the state that
initiated liberal reforms in the Communist era, such as Lenin's New
Economic Politics in 1920s, Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist campaign in 1956,
and Gorbachev's perestroika in the late 1980s. The question about the
role of the state and commune in Russian history was not settled in the
19th century, and it reemerged with a new force after the October
Revolution of 1917.
The Early Images of Communism and Its Place in Russian History
Did the Bolshevik-led uprising move Russia into or away from mainstream

European history? According to Vladimir Lenin and other Marxists who
embraced the bolshevik premises, the Russian revolution was firmly
grounded in the world-historical (read "Western") process. The fact that
the first "proletarian revolution" occurred in a largely peasant country
where capitalism was still in the nascent stage did not bother bolsheviks.
They expected the Russian revolution to be followed by an uprising in the
more economically developed Western countries, which could help solidify
the revolutionary gains in Russia .
But there were also other commentators, including some Marxists, who
rejected this interpretation of the Bolshevik revolution. Perhaps the most
remarkable among the doubters on the left was Peter Struve. A prominent
Russian intellectual who came under the spell of Marx's teaching in his
youth, he formulated a far-reaching critique of bolshevism from the
standpoint of "scientific Marxism." [8] Struve pointed out that Marxism
gave its seal of approval to capitalism and bourgeois institutions as
historically superior to the relatively undifferentiated precapitalist
conditions. In contrast to the bolsheviks, Struve touted Marxism as a
paean to the Western bourgeois values and not to primitive communism,
which Marx had explicitly denounced in his writings. Yet, it was precisely
this primitive communism willed into being by the toiling masses under
the guidance of the communist party that Lenin and his followers distilled
as the essence of Marxism. Having raised political expediency over
economic necessity, the party's will over evolutionary gradualism, Lenin
had unwittingly succumbed to the old Russian tradition, where individual
rights had been routinely sacrificed to state imperatives and force
routinely used to accomplish political goals. Lenin's emphasis on the
cleansing role that the wholesome proletariat plays in revolutionary
transcendence also seemed to have dovetailed with the slavophile
sensibilities rather than with Western political dynamics.
We should note here that Marx's teaching partially justified the "romantic"
interpretation of revolution. There was a strong utopian component in
Marx, which he never fully overcame and which was embedded in his
notion of the proletariat as the class-messiah called upon to cleanse the
world from the original sin of alienation to which humans succumbed when
they embraced culture, science, and technology. This Rousseauistic
element nourished the crypto-slavophile leanings of Russian communists.
We could see that in the case of Nikolai Berdiaev, an outstanding Russian
philosopher who read Marx in a romantic, if not messianic, fashion. Many
years after he lost his youthful enthusiasm for Marxism, Berdiaev
recollected in his autobiography his early infatuation with the Marxist

notion of the proletariat:
Class truth is indeed a non sequitur. But [back then I thought that] there
could be a class lie, which is evident in the bourgeois classes who sinned
by exploiting other human beings. The proletariat is free from the sin of
exploitation; it is socio-psychologically ripe for the message of truth and
justice determined by the transcendental consciousness. That is to say,
both psychological predisposition and transcendental necessity are
intimately intertwined in the working class. [9]
This testimony suggests that at least some Russian communists took
"proletariat" to be a Marxist code word for the slavophile communal man,
i.e., a holistic, natural being transcending the alienated conditions of his
time. The toiling people were cast here as a transhistorical force destined
to redeem Russia 's, and by implication, humanity's sins. The Western
rhetoric masked the peculiarly Russian sensibilities, incompatible with a
positivistic reading that Marxism would be given in much of Western
Europe.
Now, if we turn to the slavophile-inspired response to the revolutionary
movement in Russia , we could see that it was far more reserved than
that of Marxists, though it was not entirely unsympathetic. Slavophiles,
you may recall, harbored a deep suspicion about the state as a foreign
entity on the native Russian soil. They also shun liberalism because, they
feared, it could breed violence. (Dostoyevsky expressed this fear in his
famous novel "Demons," where he depicted a liberal-idealist father and his
radical nihilist son). From this vantage point, slavophile intellectuals could
not possibly be enamored with orthodox Marxism and its westernizing
influence in Russia . But communism's egalitarian spirit appealed to
slavophiles. They also entertained a mystic belief in the sacred calling of
the Russian people and the special role of native commune, which could
be construed as an analogue of the liberating class and authentic
harmonious community envisioned by the communists. Alexander Block, a
talented poet particularly sensitive to the slavophile ethos, hailed the
revolutionary movement in Russia as a spontaneous popular uprising
guided by the primeval instincts and yearnings for justice. He transformed
the familiar slavophile polarity of State and Land into the titanic struggle
between culture and nature, civilization and the organic historical
elements, with the revolution signifying the ultimate triumph of the
natural man over flabby civilized humanity. "The Folk could not be base,"
intoned Block, "this elemental force which cannot and should not become
aware of itself will never deserve a bad word from the poet. You do not
call the rabble people who came from the soil they till, who resemble the

morning fog from which they crystallized, the beast which they hunt."
[10] Block's musings about the Folk qua elemental force sweeping
artificial political institutions in its path would provide a basis for an
account of the revolution as the victory of nature over culture. The
uncontrollable torrent engulfing the islands of civilization in the vast
Russian sea -- this is how the Bolshevik revolt appeared to the slavophileminded Russian intellectuals in the early revolutionary era. The
westernizer Peter Struve saw the revolution along similar lines, even
though his judgment on it was negative: "The bolshevik uprising and the
bolshevik reign represent the social and political reaction of egalitarian
masses against centuries-old efforts to Europeanize Russia , both socially
and economically." [11] Here is another statement by the Russian
philosopher S. L. Frank: "In its socio-political essence, the Russian
revolution is nothing else than the painful crisis of the rapid
democratization in Russia ." [12] This accelerated democratization had
little to do with democracy as the term is understood today. Rather, the
term meant the revolt of the elements against the encroachment of the
social forces. But what Alexander Pushkin decried as the "Russian
insurrection, senseless and merciless," acquired in the early twentieth
century a new and higher cultural value. Again, Alexander Block led the
way here (though not without the influence of Nietzsche) by sharply
contrasting culture and natural force to "civilization."
Very symptomatic in this respect is a group that named itself after the
ancient nomadic tribes of the Southern steps -- "Scythes." This
artistic/political current dates back to the first days of the Bolshevik
uprising, and besides its spiritual leader, Alexander Block, absorbed within
itself first-rate Russian "peasant" poets, Nikolai Kliuev and Sergei Esenin.
This connection is significant because it points to the missing link between
bolshevism (or at least the way it was perceived by some cultured
Russians immediately following the revolution) and the slavophile
tradition. The group's chief ideologist, R. V. Ivanov-Razumnik, belonged to
the party of left Social Revolutionists who formed a coalition with
Bolsheviks in the period between November 1917 and July 1918. Social
Revolutionists, in turn, traced their origins to the populists -- a powerful
intellectual/political movement that came into being in the last third of the
nineteenth century and that advocated a kind of "peasant socialism" to be
built around the familiar slavophile "commune." "Scythes" could be best
understood as a movement that gave artistic and intellectual sanctity to
the populist sentiments expressed in the twentieth century by extreme
Social Revolutionists. They thought -- quite mistakenly -- that the
bolshevik crowd was part of this primeval revolt of Russia 's peasants
against their ancient oppressors. The "nativist" October Revolution that

brought bolsheviks to power appeared to them as an antithesis to the
"westernizing" February revolution that replaced the Czarist government
with the bourgeois democratic regime. The fact that Lenin and his
followers subscribed to the Western doctrine did not bother slavophiles at
the time: Social Revolutionists and their intellectual allies saw bolshevik
Marxism as something superficial and accidental. Wittingly or unwittingly,
"Scythes" helped create a certain peasant mythology that contrasted
"bolshevism" as a native Russian phenomenon to "communism" as an
unworthy doctrine imported from the West.
"Scythes" did not exist as a coherent ideological current for long. They
disbanded after the left Social Revolutionists staged their unsuccessful
revolt against bolsheviks. But their ideas continued to resonate for quite
some time. Unmistakably "scythian" was the immensely popular novel
"Naked Year" by Boris Pilniak published soon after the October Revolution.
He depicted bolsheviks as a native force stirring the insurrection against
the Western influence in Russia . The October Revolution was glorified
here as the break with westernizing reforms initiated by Peter the Great,
as a return to the pre-Petrin and even pre-Christian pagan Russia . Lev
Trotsky, the number two Bolshevik at the time, took notice of Pilniak's
book and chose to counter it with a memorable quip. Commenting on the
Bolshevik Arkhipov, the hero depicted in the novel as a pre-Petrin,
unshaven bear of a man, Trotsky said that he knew many comrades like
Arkhipov but that, contrary to Pilniak, all of them shaved. Of course,
forced shaving was a common -- and hated by anti-westernizers -practice in Peter the Great's Russia . As subsequent developments
showed, Trotsky was far too hasty in dismissing the link between
bolshevism and anti-Western nativism in Russia . The "populist,"
"nativist," and "fundamentalist" reinterpretation of bolshevism would
become a major theme in pre- and post-perestroika debates about the
meaning and destination of Russian history.
One more influential perspective on Russian communism emerged soon
after the October Revolution. "Eurasianism," as this intellectual current
became known, could be seen as an attempt to reconcile the slavophile
premise about Russia 's unique historical destiny with the bolsheviks'
emphasis on a strong state. This influential school was founded in the
1920s by Russian emigres Nikolai Trubetskoy, Lev Karsavin, Georgy
Florofskii, Pavel Suvchinsky, Peter Savitsky, and Georgy Vernadsky.
Eurasianists interpreted the Bolshevik revolution as the triumph of the
Eurasian principles over European reforms in Russian history. According to
Nikolai Trubetskoi, [13] the most influential figure among eurasianists,
Russians shared their mentality and political sensibilities not with other

Slavs but with the Turkic people inhabiting the Eurasian steps. Just as
Turks, Russians could not work out a worldview of their own, but easily
adopted coherent, schematically simple beliefs. Turks accepted Islam,
Russians borrowed their Christianity from Byzantium . In its emphasis on
"ritual piety," Trubetskoi implied, the Orthodox Christianity was not so
different from Islam. Similarly, Russian culture lacked the characteristic
Western emphasis on personality and legal rights -- another trait that
hinted at its non-Western origins. As other eurasianists, Trubetskoi
praised the Mongol-Tartar domination over Russia as a positive chapter in
Russian history. For some two-and-a-half centuries under Mongol rule,
Russians developed their political tradition, marked first and foremost by
the powerful state institutions. The fabric of Russian statehood, said
Trubetskoi, might have been "poorly designed but deftly sown together."
If the Moscow Czardom was largely a creation of Mongol yoke, the
Bolshevik state owed its being to the Germanic influence. Under the
veneer of Western phraseology, however, communist Russia preserved
and even strengthened its imperial Eurasian heritage. From this fact,
eurasianists optimistically inferred that the nation's future was bright: in
due course, Russia would reclaim its cultural archetype marked by strong
state power and the subordination of the individual to the social whole.
The eurasianist writings bore more than a fleeting resemblance to Oswald
Spengler's famous thesis about Europe 's imminent demise. Just like
Spengler, eurasianists tried to isolate "socio-cultural types" supposedly
governed by historical fate and not by choices made by conscious
historical agents. Members of this school also studiously avoided value
judgments. The fact that personality in the Turkic socio-cultural type
bowed to the state was neither good nor bad, according to eurasianists. It
should not be taken as a mark of "Russian servility" but as the sign of a
genuine respect for power indispensable to a strong state. While no
judgement was passed here explicitly, it was quite clear that eurasianists
saw the Russian mentality as a viable alternative to the Western political
tradition, if not the way of the future for the entire world.
To sum up, the October Revolution evoked conflicting interpretations from
those who lived through it. To Lenin's followers, the proletarian revolution
appeared to be an episode in the universal drama of history, the first step
toward the kingdom of freedom where all the nations were heading at a
varying pace. The revolution that crushed capitalism turned Russia into
the vanguard of the world-historical emancipation. This sanguine
interpretation was countered by liberal intellectuals like Peter Struve, who
were appalled by Lenin's disregard for civil rights and democratic
procedures and saw Russia 's failure to develop a Western-style legal state

as an indictment against the revolution. The slavophile-inspired writers,
also known as "Scythes," felt a certain affinity with the revolution's
egalitarian and communal ethos but concerned about the communists'
modernizing propensities and their reliance on the powerful state. And
eurasianists labored to reconcile the bolshevik etatism with the slavophile
nativism.
All these perspectives on the place of communism in Russian history
resurfaced in the Soviet era and were further elaborated by the critics and
advocates of communism.
The Westernizing Dissidents and Their Critique of Soviet
Communism
If in its formative years the communist regime glossed over certain
ideological diversity, Joseph Stalin put an end to serious debates about
the country's destiny and its relation to the West. Any view that did not
accord with Stalin's latest pronouncements placed the nonconformist into
mortal danger. After Stalin's death, however, the polemics would resume - subdued and muted at first but increasingly open and vociferous with the
passage of time. The dissident circles that sprang up in urban centers
following Khrushchev's thaw contributed heavily to this resurgent interest
in the nation's past and the willingness to reconsider its future. Among the
first to take up the issue once more were liberal dissidents who sought to
pry open the Bolshevik tradition with liberal Marxist schemes.
The first instinctive reaction of Russian crypto-liberals emerging from their
decades-long hibernation was the campaign to cleanse Marxism-Leninism
from "Stalinist perversion." This liberal line was all the more convenient in
that it jibed well with the official line proclaimed by Khrushchev at the
20th Congress of the Communist Party. The critique of Stalin was carried
out under the banners of "restoring Leninist principles," the latter being
presented by official propaganda as the historically approbated guidelines
for building a humane socialism. Outside the party officialdom, the
historian Roy Medvedev was the movement's most vocal adherent. He
tried to prove the unprovable, namely that the locomotive of Soviet
history was derailed by the evil genius of one man -- Joseph Stalin. That
something might have been wrong with the communist project itself did
not seem to cross Medvedev's mind. In time, a modified version of this
intellectual/political current branched out that condemned "true Leninism"
as a peculiarly Russian perversion of Marxism. It was no longer Stalin vs.
Lenin but Lenin vs. Marx. The old controversy between westernizers and
slavophiles reappeared in a new form. This debate smoldered for a while

without attracting much attention in the West, but it was implicit in the
early samizdat (clandestine self-publishing) publications and it influenced
the writings by Soviet emigres who began to leave Russian in the early
70s.
Along side and somewhat apart from this thorny issue, a new kind of
westernizing current found a foothold in Russia that transformed this
theoretical question into an explicit political program. I am talking about
the Human Rights Movement that made itself known in Russia and the
West in the early 60s. Its adherents derived their inspiration from the
liberal Western precept that a law-abiding state respecting inalienable
human rights is indispensable for the civilized, democratic society. Dr.
Andrey Sakharov, the widely recognized leader of Soviet liberal
westernizers, spearheaded this movement with carefully worded, yet
daring by the standards of the time, leaflets that first appeared in
Soviet samizdat and were later reprinted in the West. Dissidence grew in
prominence after 1963, when Khrushchev was deposed from his position
as the party leader; it became a highly visible form of resistance to official
communist dogma after the Soviet-led invasion that crashed the Prague
Spring in 1968.
The dissident movement of the 70s was a heterogeneous phenomenon. It
harbored intellectuals supporting the Western-liberal program of the
Russian renewal as well as the critics of Soviet power with undisguised
slavophile leanings. The latter included a highly influential group of
village-prose writers, among which could be counted Alexander
Solzhenitsyn. Too complex a figure to be subsumed under a neat political
label, Solzhenitsyn was a writer and a political essayist highly respected in
dissident circles for his personal courage and literary gift. His "stylistic
integrity" prevented him from embracing extreme ideological claims,
whether coming from the political left or right, but his politics had a
pronounced anti-Western bias. In particular, Solzhenitsyn harbored a deep
suspicion about Russian and Soviet liberals. In his famous literary memoir,
The Calf and the Oak, he ridiculed the liberals' reliance on legal-rational
concepts like "human rights" and "legal state" and scorned Valery
Chalidze, a leader of the Human Rights Movement, who had been allowed
to go to the West on a "lecture tour" -- a decision that could not have
been done without a KGB approval, as Solzhenitsyn sarcastically pointed
out. [14]Personal animosities aside, the reemerging ideological split
between the new westernizers and slavophiles (if we are to stick with an
old taxonomy) marked an important development in Soviet historical
culture, which reignited an interest among Russian intellectuals in the
centuries-old discourse about Russia 's destiny. While new westernizers

continued to blame Russia's historical tradition for the nation's
misfortunes and saw the best hope for the future in the country's rejoining
the West, neo-Slavophiles decried the foreign influence in Russia and
urged the return to the roots as the only solution to the country's
problems. Intellectuals sympathetic to the slavophile tradition frame the
question even more broadly. The entire modern culture is mortally ill, they
insist; Russia is but the first victim of Western liberalism; unless forced to
retreat, the Occidental model would continue to self-destruct, dragging
down with it other, more viable cultural forms.
The Neo-Slavophile Ambivalence Toward Communism
Whereas liberal intellectuals in the post-Stalin era tended to gloss over the
difficulties facing the capitalist West, the conservative opponents of
bolshevism idealized the native cultural tradition. A prominent place
among Soviet conservatives belonged to village-prose writers or socalledderevenshchiki, who focused their critique on the devastating impact
that communist policies had on the nation's physical environment and its
rural population. Valentin Rasputin, Vasily Belov, and Viktor Astafiev are
perhaps the most prominent members of this group, but it was
undoubtedly Alexander Solzhenitsyn who galvanized this powerful
political-literary current. Particularly instructive in this respect is
Solzhenitsyn's attacks on bolsheviks-westernizers, with their unabashedly
technocratic ethos. Technocratic westernism was quite popular among the
Russian artistic intelligentsia. It had its adherents among bolsheviks as
well. Nikolai Bukharin comes to mind here; his pro-Western and antislavophile sentiments came to the fore in his article about Esenin's death
in which he claimed that the poet's suicide marked the passing of the old,
peasant, patriarchal Russia and the emergence of the new -- industrial
and socialist -- Soviet Union . Another prominent technocratic westernizer
who earned scorn from Solzhenitsyn and neo-slavophiles was Maxim
Gorky. This prominent writer come Soviet bureaucrat edited a volume
about an early Soviet era construction project -- Belomorkanal -- the
channel between the White sea and the Baltic water basin built on Stalin's
order. For Gorky , the project exemplified the grand battle between
culture and nature, with bolshevism carrying out the rationalizing,
Europeanizing mission that promised to bring industrialization and rational
organization of labor to Russia . For Solzhenitsyn and his followers, the
project symbolized the reckless disregard for nature, environment, and
human lives typical of the communist rule: the project had little or no
economic significance, adversely affected environment, and claimed
numerous casualties among political prisoners who were forced to labor in

degrading conditions.
The anti-state and anti-communist agenda advanced by village-prose
writers marked the resurgence of slavophilism in Soviet Russia. We find in
this neo-slavophile current a powerful strand of Rousseauist rhetoric
celebrating a back-to-nature life style and waxing nostalgic about
patriarchal values once found in the peasant commune. According
to derevenshchiki, these simple values were systematically destroyed by
the communist policies of forced collectivization and mechanization of
village life. The tractor -- the machine touted by bolsheviks as a chief tool
of peasant emancipation -- was denounced by village-prose writers as an
instrument of "Americanization" destroying traditional Russia . Village
prose was the revolt of the swamp against land reclamation, a stirring cry
for help on behalf of starving, exploited, demoralized, and gradually
disappearing Russian peasantry that was sacrificed to the communists'
ambitious industrialization plans. After Gorbachev unleashed his
perestroika, village-prose writers quickly moved to political center stage,
mounting a strong campaign against the government-sponsored plans to
divert water from Siberian rivers to Central Asia . This widely publicized
political initiative, which in the end persuaded the government to drop its
ecologically disastrous plans, earned village-prose writers public
sympathy. This was the first successful campaign in the Soviet Union 's
history where public opinion prevailed on a vital policy matter.
Considerable public capital that village writers earned with their talented
literary prose and civic courage tended to obscure another, far less
benign, aspect of their political agenda. I am talking
about derevenshchiki's nativist, anti-Western proclivities. Ecological
catastrophes, like the Chernobyl nuclear plant explosion, evolved in their
writings into a broad anti-progressivist metaphor. The writers of this
school pinned on the West the responsibility for all the suffering that the
country had gone through under the Bolshevik rule. As long as Russia
remained preoccupied with the world politics and allowed itself to be
dragged into conflicts on the other end of the globe, it would continue to
neglect its own people. Worse, it will serve as a dump for the Western
waste -- industrial, political, and social. Communism appeared
to derevenshchiki as just another discarded Western project that was
carried out on Russian soil against the wishes of the Russian people. For
Soviet intellectuals embracing the slavophile teaching, this was more than
a literary trope: it was an indubitable, pernicious reality that required
urgent action.
There is much that is sound in the village-prose writers' critique of Soviet

communism. You cannot read their works, especially their literary
accounts, without sympathy for the plight of Russian peasantry. It is also
widely acknowledged today that industrial civilization has left in its wake
appalling ecological and spiritual byproducts. But in their attacks on
science and technology, derevenshchiki went far beyond like-minded
Western critics. In the postcommunist period, the village-prose writers'
polemics have grown into a full-blown anti-Western program that equated
European civilization with technocratic extremism. This program has a
strong nativist flavor, most evident in Igor Shafarevich's book Rusophobia,
[15] where the author offers a quasi-theoretical analysis that decries Jews
as a conduit for Western ideas in Russia . The author discerns two
contradictory currents operating in nature: an organic movement of life
itself (something akin to Bergson's "creative evolution") and a theoretical
force of "pure reason" exploited by those who, in the name of abstract
reforms, distort nature's own inimitable, mystic ways. According to
Shafarevich, Jews are notorious villains determined to force on reality
their abstract ideological schemes and in the process destroy the organic
foundations of nature and society. Jews, whom the biblical tradition treats
as the "salt of the earth," are cast in this paranoid theory as an
embodiment of evil, a people collectively responsible for their past and
present crimes against humanity. The nativist tendencies already present
in slavophilism are pushed to the extreme in this neo-slavophile reading,
which renounces every political and social innovation as a retreat and
perversion. One can no longer call this stance "cultural conservatism";
rather, it is "hysterical conservatism," for it anathemizes any literary or
political criticism directed at Russia as blasphemy and treason. [16]
As we pass judgment on contemporary slavophilism, we should bear in
mind the paradoxical metamorphosis that has marked this intellectual
current. There is no reason to doubt derevenshchiki's sincere concern for
the plight of Russia under the communist rule. Neo-slavophiles opposed
communism, sometimes openly, way before it became a safe, popular
sport in Russia. [17] What neo-slavophiles refuse to see, however, is that
Russia was not just a hapless victim raped by the historical forces imposed
from without, as neo-Slavophiles like to picture it, but a determined
aggressor carrying a considerable destructive and self-destructive
potential. In bolshevism, Russia -- this "mystical broad" (to use an
expression that Nikolai Berdiaev coined about Rozanov, an archetypical
Russian slavophile) -- mutated from a "meek" into a "predatory" type, as
an early 20th century literary critic, Apollon Grigoriev, would have put it.
This transformation is echoed today in the paradoxical alliance that neoslavophiles formed with communists in the post-Gorbachev era. When
called upon to assess bolshevism on the 75th anniversary of its ascension

to power, anti-communist Shafarevich declined to indict it on the ground
that settling old accounts now could only sow disunity among the true
patriots, whose urgent task was to confront their common enemy: liberals
preying on Mother Russia. Valentin Rasputin, the most talented writer in
the village-prose group and a patented anti-communist, experienced a
similar change of heart. During the first Congress of Peoples' Deputies, he
voiced his opposition to the anti-army stance taken by the emboldened
glasnost press. Later on, he joined the National Salvation Front that united
communists and nationalists into a "red-brown" faction and defended the
very communism that killed the Russian village and despoiled his beloved
lake Baikal . Now Rasputin is saying that Western communism lost its
international agenda after being transplanted onto slavic soil and, with the
passage of time, evolved into a benign, genuinely national cultural form
dovetailing with the Russian political tradition. The same shamelessly
procommunist sentiments can be found in such slavophile publications as
Nash Sovremennik and Den'. One could hardly think of greater irony: neoslavophiles who started with denouncing communism as a planned
destruction of Russia turned out to be the last communists' allies in postSoviet Russia .
Reasons for such a miraculous transformation are many. The most
important among these are the warped consciousness bred by Soviet
Russia's isolation from the world civilization. This isolation is at the heart
of the neo-slavophile belief that Russia and the West are antithetical
historical entities, that the two oppose each other as the masculine and
the feminine, form and matter, executioner and victim. The neo-slavophile
philosophy of history reveals the deep-seated fear of historical change and
critical reason that goes back to the prerevolutionary times (remember
Leo Tolstoy's War and Peace). This philosophy also shows its proponents'
failure to appreciate both the historical and metaphysical role of human
rights and individuality. In place of the concrete historical personality,
neo-slavophiles put "people" -- a collective national body endowed with
natural wisdom and superhuman capacity to behold unvarnished truth.
The personological aspect of being, by contrast, is dismissed as an
aberration, as a product of critical reason wilfully encroaching on nature's
imminent domain. With their stilted opposition between Russia (standing
for the natural, organic form of historical being) and the West
(representing the evolutionary hypertrophy of abstract reason), neoslavophiles suppress all evidence that points to the historical crossfertilization between Russia and the West. As a result, they fail to
complete their critique of the communist utopia, which continues to appeal
to neo-Slavophiles on a gut level as a teaching that elevates nature over
culture, society over the individual, communal imperatives over human

rights. Communism favored by neo-slavophiles is not only a native but
also a nativist phenomenon, it is a slavic "Land communism" juxtaposed
to the occidental "State communism." And if one is looking for a proof that
communism is in some way endemic to Russian mentality, it could be
gleaned from the persistent strand of slavophile nativism in Russian
political thought. Isolationism, nativism, and obstinate anti-westernism
demonstrate the limits of slavophilism as both an intellectual and political
phenomenon.
The Resurgence of Eurasianism in Russia
Slavophiles and eurasianists alike have sought to drive a wedge between
Russia and the West. But where slavophilism stresses the uniquely slavic
path toward nation-building that eschews etatism and relies on native
commune, eurasianism affirms the common destiny of the Russian and
Asian people and pin their hopes on the resurrection of imperial Russia .
Lev Gumilev and his prodigious writings form the vital link between
original eurasianism which emerged as a coherent intellectual-political
current in the Russian emigre community and the nascent Eurasianist
movement in post-Soviet Russia . Gumilev's pedigree (he was the son of
Anna Akhmatova and Nikolai Gumilev, two of Russia 's great poets
victimized by communists), lent his ideas a special significance in the eyes
of his contemporaries. Gumilev spent his youth in Stalin's prison camps
where he first learned about eurasianism from Peter Savitsky, a member
of the original Prague group arrested by the Soviets during World War
Two. It is said that people subjected to prolonged isolation in prison
sometimes become monomaniacs. Gumilev's case supports this view.
Otherwise, it would be hard to understand why an offspring of an
extraordinarily cultured Russian family embraced without apparent
reservations this reactionary political doctrine.
Even before Gorbachev, Gumilev managed to publish in the official press
his work on "the great steppe" and its role in the history of Turkic people,
with whom, Gumilev implied, the Russians shared some psychological
traits. He radicalized the old metaphor of "soil," which was for him not just
a symbol but a bio-geological ground for the folk's habits, a physiological
source of national uniqueness. According to Gumilev, the laws of history
are similar to the laws that propel the swarms of locust to advance and
recede. The border that separates Russia from the West coincides with the
negative isotherm for the month of January. In other words, nature itself
sets apart the two cultural entities. One of his followers, Dmitri Balashov,
paraphrased Gumilev in this way: the iron plow that destroys the soil's

organic structure destroys Russia as well. And here is a statement from
Gumilev's programmatic article "The Last Eurasianist" in which he openly
declares himself an heir to the eurasianist legacy:
All Eurasian ethnoses managed to live and prosper as long as they stayed
on their native territory. However, they perished . . . when intermingled
with alien worlds. All contacts on the superethnic level yielded negative
results. . . . The Eurasian concept of ethnocultural regions . . . applies to
the world-historical process as well. Wherever emulation [mimesis]
prevails, it runs contrary to originality and violates the principle "know
thyself" and "be your own self." [18]
As an intellectual movement, original eurasianism encountered strong
criticism in the emigre community. No lesser luminary than Nikolai
Berdiaev voiced his opposition to this strand of Russian thought. He
pointed out a striking resemblance between Marxism and Eurasianism:
both intellectual strands hail necessity and scorn choice and freedom as
factors in history. It is this deterministic and monistic metaphysics, rather
than any shared political sympathies, that explains the eurasianists'
willingness to cooperate with bolsheviks, their endorsement of the Soviet
state as the continuation of the Russian ethnos's historical mission. Father
Georgy Florofsky, once a member of the original Eurasianist group,
dissociated himself from the movement and mounted an influential
theological critique of Eurasianism. In his article titled "Metaphysical
Underpinnings of Utopianism" he wrote:
A utopianist is bound to read history in teleological categories, as a
development, unfolding of the innate traits, as the growth of a seed. . . .
What is justified here is the world and history as a whole rather than man
and personal life. This historical teleology rationalizes an antiindividualistic bias of utopian consciousness. Human being -- species
being -- is tied in with nature here, while societal good is blown to the
cosmic proportions. . . . Herein lies the commandment to obey -- it is
madness to struggle with reality itself, just grasp the "natural evolutionary
trends" and adopt yourself to them. Historical automatism alleviates the
risk of failure, and along the lines kills the very possibility of creativity.
[19]
This critique is targeted not only against eurasianism but also against
Marxist historical metaphysics, Spengler's organic determinism, and
certain strands in Russian theological thought which advocated various
forms of Christian platonism (Sergei Bulgakov, Pavel Florensky, Lev
Karsavin) with its emphasis on a preordained divine plan for historical

development that rules out novelty and emergence. This line of critique is
very timely, for it exposes fatalism and anti-humanism deeply rooted in
Russian consciousness and palpably present in several powerful currents
in today's political thought. Calls to restore the Russian empire to its past
glory are heard today from such diverse personages as neo-slavophile
Rasputin, communist Ziuganov, etatist Prokhanov, and it is highly
indicative that these diverse thinkers and groups invoke eurasianist
arguments to justify their demands. Radical nationalists and etatists
(derzhavniki) conceive future Russia as a great Eurasian empire that
unites Orthodoxy and Islam on the basis of shared physical territory,
kindred psychological traits, and common stress on ritual piety. Perhaps
Trubetskoi and Gumilev were right and Islam is Russian Orthodox
Christianity minus Christ. There certainly was a historical precedent for
the Great Eastern Orthodox Christian state converting to Islam -Byzantium . But as the 19th century philosopher Vladimir Soloviev pointed
out, Byzantium fell not so much because of the irresistible force of the
Muslim arms but because it exhausted its potential for inner growth, for a
spiritual resistance to Islam -- Eastern Christianity surrendered the
Christian spirit of freedom. It seems that today's imperial derzhavniki are
ready for a similar surrender. This is just another paradox of Russian
history: if neo-slavophile derevenshchiki feel nostalgic about the
communism that defiled the country's environment, then neoeurasianist derzhavniki are sizing up the political yoke that Russians shook
back in the 15th century. They are willing to be slaves, as long as they are
members of a great empire. The question is whether this is the last gasp
of the imperial Russian idea or the beginning of the new cycle in the
geopolitical struggle for Eurasian supremacy?
Russian Communism as a Spiritual Phenomenon
The breakdown of the Soviet regime in Russia brought in its wake a
heightened interest in the long-suppressed Russian thought. Many readers
saw in slavophilism, religious philosophy, and great Russian literature an
antidote to communism. Some hoped to find therein a special path that
could save Russia from the extremes of Western rationalism and
capitalism. However, the "Russian idea" proved to be exceedingly
muddled, and the blueprint for the future it offered to its adherents
seemed to be tainted by the very communist spirit to which the Russian
idea was supposed to be immune. Nothing illustrates this point better than
the plight of the Orthodox Church in postcommunist Russia.
The renaissance of Russian Orthodoxy began long before perestroika.
Many dissidents saw in religion a natural bulwark against godless

communism and actively sought to establish ties with the Russian
Orthodox Church. The passing of communism spurred a religious revival.
In the early perestroika years, the Church visibly strengthened its
positions; for a while, it wielded a considerable moral authority, and its
blessing was central to settling political disputes. Politicians of different
stripes made a point to be observed attending church ceremonies and
actively sought audiences with the Patriarch of all Russia. This revival
proved surprisingly short-lived, however. Once a dissident and now a
radical nationalist, Vladimir Osipov recently lamented that the Russian
Church was once again treated as a nuisance, its priests singled out for a
ridicule. This loss of authority has much to do with the fact that, freed
from the state patronage, the Church showed little stomach for
administrative independence and creative spirituality. The church leaders
seem to desire little more than a new alliance with the state that would
restore the Church to its pre-bolshevik role as an official state religion. For
centuries, Russian Orthodoxy operated under the heavy state patronage,
and its servile attitude to the powers apparently became an ingrained
habit. Open support that some church leaders showed to the communist
nationalists further discredited the Church as a political force (the most
insidious case of this kind is Mitropolit Ioan of St. Petersburg, whose
ultranationalist and crypto-anti-Semitic sentiments had been disavowed,
albeit only tacitly, by the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church). The
proud talk about Eastern Christianity as a core of Russian culture,
supported by such giants of the Russian spirit as Fedor Dostoyevsky,
turned out to be groundless. The Church's equivocal pronouncements and
less than forthright actions dealt a devastating blow to many Christians
who pinned their hopes for national renewal on Russian Orthodoxy as a
guardian of national values.
Without dwelling on the metaphysics of Eastern Orthodoxy, we can point
out that its diminishing stature in public opinion has much to do with its
ritualism, with its conservative organizational forms, with the fact that the
Church in Russia had never gone through a genuine Reformation. Official
Russian Orthodoxy sanctified the quasi-spiritual forms of patriarchal life
inimical to personality, human rights, individual initiative -- cultural forms
central to modernity. The Church opposed not only political but also
spiritual creativity, which made it suspicious of any new departure. The
excommunication of Leo Tolstoy -- this Russian Luther of sorts, who
protested the Church's corrupt ways and called for church reforms -- is
highly emblematic in this context. An even stronger indictment against
Russian Orthodoxy was the persecution of so-called "old believers" -- a
powerful 17th movement that broke away from the established church.
This latter episode in the history of eastern Christianity is particularly

pertinent today when the country is striving to build a market economy. It
is well known that early capitalist entrepreneurs in Russia came in
disproportionate numbers from the ranks of the old believers, who formed
the proto-bourgeois stratum in Russia. Their marginal status as a
persecuted minority and strong religious convictions emphasizing personal
responsibility and the need for continuous self-improvement remind one of
Weberian puritans engendering the "spirit of capitalism" in the Western
world. Sergei Bulgakov noted this fact in his 1909 review of Weber's
famous book The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism. [20] The
official Orthodoxy, by contrast, frowned upon entrepreneurial activity, as it
still does, remaining more or less aloof from efforts to develop a market
economy in Russia . This indifference is evident not so much in the open
opposition to capitalism as in the official stamp of approval that the
Church bestowed on the collectivist psychology endemic to patriarchal
economic and political forms. Until the Russian Orthodoxy finds the way to
sanctify the spiritual foundations on which human rights and
entrepreneurship could thrive, its contribution to political and economic
reforms in post-communist Russia will remain very limited and
inconsistent.
Religion is not the only institution that failed to manifest itself as a cultural
form resistant to communism. The same could be said about another
cultural resource that for a long time enjoyed a considerable authority in
the country -- Russian literature. "What would Russians do after the
collapse of communism?," a Russian luminary was asked in the heyday of
perestroika -- "Read literary magazines," came the answer. The answer
did not raise many eyebrows at the time. This conclusion seemed to have
been born out by the astounding explosion of publishing activity in
Gorbachev's Russia. The country revelled in its newly-found freedom to
read, to write, to criticize. Between 1987 and 1990, long-suppressed
books reached the reading public, everything from Dr. Zhivago to Dr.
Freud. But this literary orgy did not last. By the end of perestroika, the
demand for serious literature in Russia precipitously dropped. Thick
literary magazines, once obligatory reading for every intellectual, saw
their circulations cut from millions to a few thousands. The nation's
attention turned elsewhere, leaving Russian writers, poets, and film
makers to fend for themselves.
That the great Russian literature could not survive communism does not
seem strange after all. In retrospect, Russian communism was in large
measure a literary phenomenon, a popular book that enthralled its
readers and kept them from other, more mundane, pursuits. Thrust into
public eye by idealists and ideological visionaries, communism represented

a species of gnostic consciousness that longed for a cosmic revolution, for
a resplendid society that meets all human needs and takes universal
happiness as its highest goal. But the ideal of such a social world is, in the
end, more important for those who believe in it than the world itself. The
real is sacrificed to the ideal, illusion wins over fact, and the laws of
beauty gloss over the messy currents of everyday life -- which is what
literature has always been about, certainly great literature that flourished
in Russia in the 19th century and that survived into the 20th century
through the heroic efforts of writers like Alexander Solzhenitsyn.
Communism was a literary project par excellance, an aesthetics embraced
by the people who created a great literature.
Far from being merely formal, the continuity in question extends to
substantive issues as well. Epic in its scope, Russian literature expressed
the holistic consciousness endemic to primitive communism and codified
by the nation's leading writers who sought to impart a collectivist mind-set
to the elites and commoners alike. Great Russian literature flourished in
traditional patriarchal society; its preoccupation with the people and their
terrible plight was fed in part by the feeling of guilt and personal
responsibility that the educated noblemen felt toward their subjects. With
the notable exception of Dostoyevsky, Russian literature deliberately
pushed the Russians toward primeval, collective ("swarming" as Tolstoy
would have said) existence. Literature in Russia represented a discursive
form that roughly corresponded to the cosmological period in ancient
Greek thought associated with pre-Socratic philosophers. Dostoyevsky
had moments of genuine "anthropological revelation," as Berdiaev used to
say, but ultimately he called for a return to the pristine, wholesome "soil,"
just as his great contemporaries did. It is a said fact that Russian
literature failed to inoculate its readers against communist temptations,
and it failed to do so because it was anti-bourgeois and anti-personalistic
to the very core. This important precept was first powerfully enunciated by
writer Varlam Shalamov, a prisoner of the Gulag, and then popularized by
several commentators, most recently by Alexander Ageev:
Russian literature of the 19th -- "golden" -- century was the last epic,
titanic literature in European history. It flourished in a short and very
peculiar time span [when] writers, already familiar with the European,
personality-conscious literary culture . . . still felt behind their back the
biblical presence of organic folk life in all its enormous biological might.
This fact gave writers the right to speak on behalf of this elemental
dormant force; it encouraged them to undertake monumental literary
projects and assured the psychological veracity of their writings.
Surveying Russia 's endless territory, [Russian artists] felt that "eternity

was on their side." But time refused to succumb to space. What seemed
like Biblical eternity, exploded into a series of extraordinary dynamic
events. Judged against the backdrop of real history, the "golden era" of
literary flowering turned out to be a brief moment indeed. Alas, this brief
outburst of creativity exerted an inordinate influence on the spell-bound
Russian literature, which has ever since moved into the future crab-wise,
with its eyes glued to its illustrious predecessors whose accomplishments
Russian writers are still trying to emulate. [21]
The main target of this criticism is no doubt Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who
likes to rail against the younger writers preoccupied with self-expression
and indifferent to the great Russian literary tradition. What Solzhenitsyn
fails to realize is that this shift is not just an aesthetic but a cultural
historical phenomenon heralding the emergence of a new mentality in
Russia -- individualistic, bourgeois consciousness. This shift marks a
genuine historical change and presages the final demise of communism.
The new Russian literature tends to be either purely commercially or
aesthetically elitist, but this fact should be greeted as a sign that this
historical transformation is becoming irreversible. As a novelist,
Solzhenitsyn may have little to offer to the literature of the future, but as
an author of The Gulag Archipelago, he should rejoice in this
development, for along with the gruesome gulags expired great literature
-- literature as "communism."
All these heady developments were duly noted by a well-known Russian
critic Georgy Gachev. In his essay, programmatically titled "Honest Private
Life as an Alternative to Russian Literature," Gachev drew attention to the
literary memoirs written by the 18th century Russian, Andrey Bolotov.
Bolotov exemplified a relatively rare in the Russian context type of a
cultured land owner who spent considerable time improving the
agricultural yield in his estate. For Gachev, this is an astounding example
of a self-made man whose down-to-earth rational undertakings sharply
contrast with the idealistic castle-building so common among Russian
gentry and intelligentsia. Here is an excerpt from the paean to Bolotov
that Gachev wrote to dramatize this man's accomplishments and to
juxtapose them to the Russian literary cannon:
Enlightened owner! Autonomous human being -- what Englishmen call
"self-made man" who comes to terms with his environment, his own self,
and creates the conditions for decent existence. As causa sui (an attribute
of the Absolute, of God), he is a cause of himself. Amidst the conditions of
Russian autocracy, such a free private autocrat was little appreciated as a
subject of history and the source of creativity. . . . But much scorned

common sense seems to work just fine when practiced by this man:
instead of a broad Russian soul, he displays German "moderation and
reliability" -- he is a veritable anti-hero of Russian literature! . . . What we
witness is the ethos and eros of private honest life miraculously unfolding
outside mainstream history. [22]
For all its exalted tone, Gachev's "anti-literature" article, ironically
published in the journal "Literary Training," is highly symptomatic of the
subterraneous currents in contemporary Russian consciousness. This
consciousness is busy reevaluating old values and experimenting with new
attitudes. The latter goad Russians to leave behind their literary utopian
projects and embrace real life with all its complexities. Russian critics have
spotted unrecognized heros in its literary past -- private owners, hard
workers, businessmen -- and now seek to imprint their images upon mass
consciousness as models worthy of emulation. Once again, the past has
turned out to be as unpredictable as the future, and herein lies the best
hope for Russia in decades to come.
Back to the Future: Concluding Remarks on Russian Historical
Culture
As I have tried to show above, Russian communism has been nourished
by communalism, nativism, and anti-westernism -- a set of beliefs and
practices that elevate the species life over personality and sacrifice
individual freedom to collective imperatives. There is more to the Russian
tradition than its dominant historical culture would make you believe,
however, and the search is now on for alternative values that could help
the nation break out of its communist fetters.
The official memory embodied in the Russian cultural cannon is very
selective: it brings to the fore some historical events and downgrades or
completely ignores others. As the case of Andrei Bolotov suggests, this
unclaimed historical heritage is finally beginning to attract serious
attention in Russia . An enlightened owner, a self-made man, Bolotov is
transformed from a cultural villain into a hero, and along with him,
thousands of other Russian men and women once renounced for their
personal initiative as hopelessly individualist are being restored to their
proper place in the nation's cultural memory. This belated rehabilitation is
not confined to archaic figures like Bolotov but extends to more recent
personalities and their undertakings that are reappraised as valuable
cultural resources. The names of Russian entrepreneurs -- Putilov,
Obukhov, and Morozov -- are now frequently mentioned in Russia, their
products are praised for their quality, their factory buildings, still in use,

are noted for their durability and workmanship. The Russian kulak, a
much maligned family farmer hounded by Stalin's henchmen during the
forced collectivization campaign, is celebrated today for his initiative, hard
work, as well as spiritual strength in the face of endless political
repressions. Equally portentous are recent attempts to reinterpret the old
literary cannon, e.g., the novel by Mikhail Sholokhov -- "Virgin Soil." For
decades Soviet pupils studied in school this novel as a literary paean to
the battle against the kulaks. Now revisionist critics argue that the novel
could be read as a satire on communists and their never-do-good helpers
among local peasants who enforced the communist party's ruthless
policies among the rural population. Hidden historical resources are
discovered everywhere and brought back into wide cultural circulation.
The old-believers come entrepreneurs, the Russian land-owners devoted
to their land and people, even greedy profiteers -- antiheroes of Russian
literature -- are recast as bourgeois entrepreneurs courageously defying
ancient customs and asserting their will against the spineless
traditionalism of their time. Practicality, efficiency, business-like attitudes
are seen in today's Russia not only as economic virtues but also as values
indispensable for the rejuvenation of the entire spiritual/cultural domain.
What Soviet ideologists denounced as arch-heresy -- "bourgeois
mentality" -- is redefined as essential to current reforms.
To be sure, these changes have been slow in coming; there are social
strata and individuals who fervently resist attempts to reevaluate old
values and continue to extol the values of nativism. The results of the
December 1993 elections to the Russian Parliament which showed
considerable popular support for communists and ultra-nationalists are
more than a bit discouraging. But it would be wrong to view the efforts to
redefine Russian historical culture as inconsequential or to relegate them
exclusively to the cultural domain. Witness the emergence of
"nomenklatura capitalism" -- a powerful trend that has been revamping
the nation's economic and political scene in post-Soviet Russia . At the
heart of this movement is the transformation of ex-party apparatchiks,
administrators, and industrial managers into a new class of propertyowners. Far from being ideological watchdogs determined to reverse the
course of history (they are largely extinct today as a viable political
species), these remnants of the past political and economic elites strongly
support privatization and market reforms, if for no other reason, than
because they stand to benefit from these changes personally. The
confrontation between President Yeltsin and Khasbulatov's Parliament was
precipitated primarily by the tension between the central and local elites
after the latter endeavored to shed the suzerainty to their old bosses. The
haste with which the old nomenklatura began to transform itself into a

new class of property owners was scandalous indeed, but the politicaleconomic thrust of this process was undoubtedly positive. It marked the
dispersion of power in Russia , its gradual metamorphosis from a political
form of totalitarian control into an economically-based and hard-won
authority. This process is the best guarantee that the difficult transition to
a market economy would be a nonviolent, even if unseemly, process. No
need to "liquidate the nomeclatura as a class" (to use the Bolsheviks'
favorite expression) -- the mutation would be graduate and voluntary.
This transformation of yesterday's nomenklatura workers into today's
bourgeois property owners might be even more significant than sputtering
democratic political reforms: while the latter could be reversed under the
emergency powers granted to the Russian President, the latter are far less
likely to be dismantled by any presidential decree or legislative action.
Today's situation brings to mind the earlier-mentioned historical precedent
-- Andrei Bogoliubsky's refusal to move to the Kievan principality as
mandated by the Rurik house nomenklatura system. This pioneering
attempt at privatization was restarted after the collapse of the communist
party nomenklatura, and there is reason to believe that this time the
process will go far enough to become irreversible. Nomenclatura
functionaries are eager to trade off their coveted positions in the
state/party hierarchy for a place in the emerging economic order, to
exchange their political status for the promise of economic riches. The
decentralization of political power, the regionalization of economic activity,
the fusion of economic and political authority, the sanctification of private
property -- these developments might seem like the return to "feudalism,"
but in Russian history they count as progress. The new trends were
slowed down by the executive power's struggle against legislative
independence and presidential decrees stifling regional autonomy, but
they could hardly be reversed. It is highly unlikely that Russia would ever
return to a unitary, nomenklatura state. [23]
If post-Soviet Russia offers any historical lesson, it is that the past is a
valuable national resource, that it is as problematic as the future, and that
alternative scenarios for the future are inextricably linked to the discovery
of an alternative past. It is time for Russian thinkers to reexamine those
periods in their history when the nation enjoyed close relations with the
West, most notably the St. Petersburg era and the empire built by Peter
the Great. Moving further back into Russian history, one could ponder
what the historian G. P. Fedotov hailed as a " Moscow servicemen" and
what Dostoyevsky described as a "state servant" -- a shrewd man who
repeatedly demonstrated his flexibility, resourcefulness, capacity to adopt
to extreme circumstances, find ingenuous solutions to knotty practical

problems. [24] Today's industrial managers keeping their enterprises
afloat under the most trying conditions are the latest incarnation of this
historical type. The ex-nomenklatura functionaries, or at least its most
productive part, show the will to become capitalist entrepreneurs and turn
Russia into a viable market economy. This servant of the state who used
to do the powers' bidding has shown that he has a mind of his own. Like
the "slave" transcending his bondage and mastering his "master" in the
Hegelian dialectical scheme, the Russian serviceman survived autocracy
and numerous ideological overlords and even stood up to the state that
oppressed him. This uncanny ability to transform the environment,
transcend the organic tradition, keep moving ahead during the transitional
periods of "radical historical transformation" (Berdiaev) is Russia's
greatest historical resource. After all, efforts to break with the past are as
much a constant in Russian history as attempts to stem reform and
preserve the status quo. Or as the slavophile Khomiakov pointed out,
there was hardly a more typical persona in Russian history than the archreformer Peter the Great.
The reform confronting today's Russia is not dissimilar to many others
that preceded it. It can be best described as the "new westernization."
This reform has a decent chance to succeed because it trades on familiar
territory, because it represents the return to the well-trodden path from
which Russia had been pushed by a series of unique historical
circumstances. Knowledge the Russians need to see this transition
through will be based on their historical experience -- it will be
remembrance of the things past, remembrance of the things future.
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